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Abstract
This paper applies mechanism design to the study of international conflict resolu-
tion. Standard mechanisms in which an arbitrator can enforce her decisions are usually
not feasible because disputants are sovereign entities. Nevertheless, we find that this
limitation is inconsequential. Despite only being capable of making non-binding recom-
mendations, we find that mediators are equally effective as arbitrators. We determine
optimal mediation techniques. They consist in not precisely reporting information to
conflicting parties, and specifically, in not revealing to a player with probability one that
the opponent is weak. These obfuscation techniques strictly improve the chance of peace
when the intensity of conflict is high, or when asymmetric information is significant.
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1 Introduction
Over the years, the formal theory of international relations has developed the positive
analysis of conflict by making use of advanced game theoretical techniques.1 On the contrary,
the powerful tools of mechanism design have not yet been extensively used to explore which
institutions may be more effective for conflict resolution and prevention.2 The revelation
principle, a fundamental result in mechanism design due to Myerson (1979, 1982), identifies
mediation as an efficient institution to deal with conflicts that arise because of asymmetric
information, one of the main rationalist explanations for wars.3 Indeed, mediation has played
an increasingly important role in the organization of peace talks to resolve recent international
crises. According to the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) project, 30% of international
crises for the entire period 1918–2001 were mediated, and the fraction rises to 46% for the
period 1990–2001 (see Wilkenfeld et al., 2005).
Outside international relations, the fact that private information may cause bargaining
failures has been invoked as an explanation for costly trials in the case of litigation, and
strikes in the case of wage bargaining (see Kennan and Wilson, 1993, for an early review).
In these types of ‘conflicts’, it is possible to use the standard mechanisms identified by the
revelation principle by Myerson (1979): An arbitrator with enforcement power (the power
of law or of the State), collects information from the disputants privately and then makes
binding recommendations. However, the key distinguishing feature of international crises or
disputes is that the players involved are sovereign entities, and hence there is no legitimate
or recognized third party to which they can credibly delegate decision and enforcement power
1See Jackson and Morelli (2011) for an updated survey of such positive analysis.
2A few papers do exist that study mechanism design in international relations. See e.g. Fey and Ramsay
(2009) and all the other papers in that special issue. A discussion of the importance of institutional design
for conflict resolution or international cooperation is in Koremenos et al (2001).
3Blainey (1988) famously argued that wars begin when states disagree about their relative power and end
when they agree again (see also, Brito and Intriligator, 1985, and Fearon, 1995). Wars may arise because
of asymmetric information about military strength, but also about the value of outside options or about the
contestants’ political resolve, i.e., about the capability of the leaders and the peoples to sustain war. For
example, it is known that Saddam Hussein grossly under-estimated the US administration political resolve,
when invading Kuwait in 1990.
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(see e.g. Waltz, 1959). For this reason, any mechanism design model aimed to deal with
international relations has to dispense with the assumption that the third party can enforce
her decisions and, instead, focus on self enforcing mechanisms. This paper aims to compare
the effectiveness of forms of third party intervention that are used in international relations,
in the absence of enforcement power and under the assumption that the sole objective of an
unbiased mediator should be the maximization of the probability of peace.4
We consider mediation, as well as also a less potent form of third party intervention for
dispute resolution, which we call ‘communication facilitation,’ following the terminology by
Touval and Zartman (1985). By the version of the revelation principle by Myerson (1982),
optimal mediation requires that the mediator collects information privately in closed door
meetings. This practice, often called ‘shuttle diplomacy’ requires the mediator to meet the
disputants privately, and to keep the communications private, before organizing a summit
in which proposals will be discussed.5 A communication facilitator, instead, does not hold
bilateral closed door meetings: the content of any communication is open to all the disputants.6
The specific simple model of conflict we consider comprises two players who contest a fixed
amount of resources.7 A player cannot observe the opponent’s strength, political resolve, or
willingness to fight. Specifically, each player is strong (hawk) with some probability and weak
(dove) otherwise. If the two players are of the same type, war is a fair lottery; else, the stronger
wins with higher probability. For simplicity, we assume that all wars are equally costly.8 We
4Bester and Warneryd (2006) study the optimal arbitration mechanism that maximizes the probability of
a peaceful solution in a stylized conflict game. We adopt their model of conflict, but study also mediators who
cannot enforce their decisions. Among the few papers studying self-enforcing mechanisms in contexts different
from international relations, see Matthews and Postlewaite (1989), Banks and Calvert (1992), Cramton and
Palfrey (1995), Forges (1999), Compte and Jehiel (2008), and Goltsman et al. (2009).
5See, for example, Kydd (2006) and Fey and Ramsay (2010) for detailed discussions of shuttle diplomacy.
Even when the press describes a mediation attempt as if the parties were communicating at a high frequency,
like for example in the famous Camp David peace conference, the actual negotiations often follow the pattern
of shuttle diplomacy. See e.g. Stein (1999).
6For example, the WTO settlement procedure requires explicitly full transparency of all communications
among disputants. See in particular items 5,6,10 in the Annex 2 of the WTO procedural rules.
7This is a standard metaphor for many types of wars, for example those related to territorial disputes or
to the present and future sharing of the rents from the extraction of natural resources. Indeed, Bercovitch et
al (1991) show that mediation is useful mostly when the disputes are about resources, territory, or in any case
divisible issues.
8It might be interesting to allow for different costs for symmetric and asymmetric wars, but the additional
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consider revelation mechanisms in which the two players report their types to the third party,
who then renders decisions. In the most potent form of third party intervention, arbitration,
participation is voluntary, reports are private and decisions are binding. Under mediation,
reports are private but decisions are only non binding recommendations. Hence, participation
is voluntary after the mediator presents her proposals and not only at the beginning of the
mediation. When the third party only facilitates communication, reports are open to both
disputants and, again, decisions are not binding. With each form of third party intervention,
we calculate the equilibrium that maximizes the ex ante chances of peace.
Our application of mechanism design to international conflict allows us to answer three
different questions, respectively, on whether the limitations of mediation relative to arbitration
matter, on what the optimal mediation strategies should be, and on when shuttle diplomacy
strictly improves over open facilitated communication.
We find that optimal mediation can achieve the same probability of peace as optimal
arbitration, in spite of the absence of enforcement power. Because the mediator is incapable
of enforcing settlements that yield the hawk a lower payoff than war when meeting a dove,
she confuses the hawk by not always revealing that it is meeting a dove when this is the case.
By doing so, the mediator manages to give the hawk facing a dove, in expectation, exactly
the same payoff as the arbitrator.
Second, we derive optimal mediation strategies: the mediator should use shuttle diplomacy
to obfuscate the information received by disputants. Effectively, she should avoid revealing
that one player is weak to the other with probability one. When the intensity of conflict is low
and asymmetric information is significant, the mediator should not always reveal to hawks
when they are facing a dove. Whereas when the intensity of conflict is low, the mediator
should obfuscate self-reported doves.
Our final result is a full characterization of the conditions under which optimal mediation
with shuttle diplomacy strictly dominates communication facilitation. We find that this is
notational and computational costs appear a heavy price to pay.
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the case when the intensity of conflict is high, or asymmetric information is significant.9,10
When this is not the case, obfuscation strategies are not needed to achieve the same welfare
as arbitration.
We conclude this introduction by briefly motivating our general modelling choices. In line
with the mechanism design literature, we consider unbiased mediators who have no private
information.11 Further, the mediator’s objective is the minimization of the ex ante probability
of war. Hence, our mediator must be able to commit to quit in some circumstances, instead
of seeking a peaceful agreement in all contingencies (see Watkins, 1998). Such commitments,
in fact, facilitate information disclosure by the contestants, and ultimately improve the ex
ante chances of peaceful conflict resolution. In section 5 we provide evidence that mediators
as well as disputants do recognize the value of commitment to quit in case the disputants’
demands cannot be reconciled. Finally, we study mediators who have no independent budget
for transfers or subsidies, and cannot impose peace to the contestants. To be sure, third-party
states that mediate conflict, such as the United States, are neither unbiased nor powerless;
However, single states account for less than a third of the mediators in mediated conflicts
(Wilkenfeld, 2005), so that we view our assumption not only as a useful theoretical benchmark,
but also as a reasonable approximation for numerous instances of mediated crises.12
9Interestingly, the intensity of conflict and asymmetric information are considered among the most im-
portant variables explaining when mediation is most successful (see e.g. Bercovitch and Houston, 2000, and
Bercovitch et al., 1991). Our findings resonate with well-documented stylized facts in the empirical literature
on negotiation (Bercovich and Jackson 2001, Wall and Lynn, 1993), that show that parties are less likely to
reach an agreement without a mediator when the intensity of conflict is high than when it is low. Rauchhaus
(2006) provides quantitative analysis showing that mediation is especially effective when it targets asymmetric
information.
10Unlike us, Fey and Ramsay (2010) do not find any advantage of shuttle diplomacy. Private information in
their model is about costs of war (private values), whereas in our model it is about the probability of winning
(interdependent values). Further, while we only consider third party intervention revelation mechanisms, they
also consider explicit bargaining protocols that shape the constraints of third party intervention.
11As some scholars claim, “mediator impartiality is crucial for disputants’ confidence in the mediator, which,
in turn, is a necessary condition for his gaining acceptability, which, in turn, is essential for mediation success
to come about” (see e.g., Young, 1967, and the scholars mentioned in Kleiboer, 1996). On the other hand,
when a mediator possesses independent information that needs to be credibly transmitted, some degree of bias
may be optimal (see Kydd, 2003, Rauchhaus, 2006).
12In the terminology of Fisher (1995), our mediators perform “pure mediation,” i.e., they gather information
and propose settlements, rather than “power mediation,” which also involves mediator’s power to reward,
punish or enforce.
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To achieve their objectives, our mediators can facilitate communication, formulate pro-
posals, and manipulate the information transmitted (see Touval and Zartman, 1985, for a
discussion of these three roles; and Wall and Lynn, 1993, for an exhaustive discussion of all
observed mediation techniques). Shuttle diplomacy requires private and separate caucuses,
and has become popular since Henry Kissinger’s efforts in the Middle East in the early 1970s
and the Camp David negotiations mediated by Jimmy Carter, in which a third party conveys
information back and forth between parties, providing suggestions for moving the conflict
toward resolution. In the real world, mediators also often prevent conflict by facilitating com-
munication or coordinating discussions among parties unwilling to communicate without a
mediator. Such instances of mediation correspond to what we call communication facilita-
tion.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the benchmark characterization
of the optimal arbitration mechanism, section 3 characterizes the optimal shuttle diplomacy
mediation and shows that it achieves the same peace probability as the optimal arbitration
benchmark; section 4 explains the role of the obfuscation strategy used in shuttle diplomacy.
Before concluding, we describe in section 5 some evidence that mediators are able to commit
to quit when disputants make demands that cannot be reconciled, as prescribed by our model.
Section 6 concludes. All the proofs are in the appendix.
2 Arbitration
This section presents a simple model of conflict with asymmetric information, and lays out
the arbitration program to minimize the chances that the conflict leads to war.
Two players contest a pie of size normalized to one.13 War shrinks the value of the pie to
θ < 1. The expected payoffs in case of war depends on both players’ private types. Each player
13Depending on the context, of course, the interpretation of the pie ranges from territory or exploitation of
natural resources to any measure of social surplus in a country or partnership.
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can be of type H or L with probability q and (1−q), respectively.14 This private characteristic
can be thought of as being related to resolve, military strength, leaders’ stubbornness, etc.
We will often refer to type H as a “hawk” and to a L type as a “dove” (with no reference to
the hawk-dove game). When the two players are of the same type, the expected share of the
pie in case of war is 1/2 for both. When a type H player fights against an L type, its expected
share of the pie is p > 1/2, and hence its expected payoff is pθ. If pθ < 1/2, the problem is
trivial, as war can always be averted with the anonymous split (1/2, 1/2); we shall assume
henceforth that pθ > 1/2.
The model has three parameters: θ, p, and q. Yet, it turns out that a more parsimonious








The parameter λ is the hawk/dove odds ratio, and γ ≥ 0 represents the ratio of benefits
over cost of war for a hawk: the numerator is the gain for waging war against a dove instead
of accepting the anonymous split (1/2, 1/2), and the denominator is the loss for waging war
against a hawk rather than accepting (1/2, 1/2). Given that γ is increasing in θ, we will also
interpret situations with low γ as situations of high intensity or cost of conflict. Note that
when λ ≥ γ, war can always be averted with the split (1/2, 1/2) because the expected payoff
of war for hawks, (1− q) pθ+qθ/2 is smaller than 1/2. We shall henceforth assume that λ < γ.
Among the institutions that one can consider to avert the risk of war, arbitration is the
simplest institution to model and the best understood one. Under arbitration, a third party
collects information privately from the disputing parties and makes binding decisions on how
to resolve the dispute. Instead, a mediator can only make non-binding recommendations
after collecting information privately. The implications of arbitration are well understood
in economic theory, because in economic applications there typically exist external agencies
14To simplify the analysis, and keep the problem’s dimensionality in check, we adopt a fully symmetric
model. We believe that our results will hold approximately, for models that are close to symmetric.
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such as the court to enforce the arbitrator’s recommendations. In the case of international
relations, instead, arbitration is not usually feasible, because disputants are sovereign entities,
and enforcement of contracts or agreements is often impossible. However, it is useful to
present arbitration in full here, as it provides a useful benchmark against which mediation
can be compared.
Invoking the version of the revelation principle proved by Myerson (1979), and proceeding
as in Bester and Wı̈¿1
2
rneryd (2006), we can set up the arbitration game as a revelation
mechanism, without loss of generality.
- After being informed of its type, each player i chooses whether to participate to the
arbitration or not.
- If both players agree, each player i privately sends a report mi ∈ {l, h} to the arbitrator.
- Given reports m = (m1, m2), the arbitrator prescribes a peaceful split (x, 1− x) with
probability p(m) and with probability 1−p (m) the arbitration fails, so that the players
escalate the conflict and fight a war.15 Unlike the reports, the arbitrator’s recommen-
dation is public.
Again by the revelation principle, without loss of generality, we restrict attention to equi-
libria in which the players agree to participate in the arbitration and adopt truthful report
strategies. Further, it can be shown that restricting attention to symmetric recommendations
is without loss of generality, because the optimal arbitration program is linear.16 Symmetry
entails that the settlement is (1/2, 1/2) if the players report the same type, that the split is
15Framed in the context of revelation mechanism, the model appears to assume that the arbitrator rec-
ommends war to disputants. This feature of the model should not be taken literally. In the real world,
often mediators quit or freeze the dispute resolution process; this usually results in conflict escalation by the
contestants. We discuss this feature of the model in detail in the section 5.
16We will see that each player’s constraints are linear in the maximization arguments. Thus, the constraint
set is convex. Hence, suppose that an asymmetric mechanism maximizes the probability of peace. Because
the set-up is symmetric across players, the anti-symmetric mechanism, obtained by interchanging the players’
identities, is also optimal. But then, the constraint set being convex, it contains also the symmetric mechanism
obtained by mixing the above optimal mechanisms. As the objective function is linear in the maximization
argument, such a symmetric mixed mechanism is also optimal.
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(b, 1− b) if the reports are (h, l) —and (1− b, b) if they are (l, h), for some b ∈ [1/2, 1] . Let
pL ≡ p (l, l) , pM ≡ p (l, h) = p (h, l) and pH ≡ p (h, h). The optimal arbitration program
determines b, pL, pM and pH so as to minimize the war probability:
min
b,pL,pM ,pH
(1− q)2 (1− pL) + 2q (1− q) (1− pM) + q
2 (1− pH)
subject to the constraints that players are willing to reveal their type truthfully (the so-called
ex interim incentive compatibility constraints) and to the constraint that the players are
willing to participate to the arbitration regardless of their types (ex interim participation
constraints). Specifically, the incentive compatibility constraint for either player of dove type
is as follows:
(1− q) ((1− pL)θ/2 + pL/2) + q ((1− pM)(1− p)θ + pM(1− b)) ≥
(1− q) ((1− pM)θ/2 + pMb) + q ((1− pH)(1− p)θ + pH/2) .
The left-hand side is the dove’s payoff when truthfully revealing its type. With probability
1−q, the opponent is also a dove, in which case the equal split 1/2 is achieved with probability
pL and the payoff from war, θ/2, is collected with probability 1− pL. With probability q, the
opponent is hawk. With probability pM , this leads to the split 1−b, and with probability 1−pM
to the payoff from war (1− p) θ. The right-hand side is the expected payoff from ‘exaggerating
strength.’ When the opponent is a dove, the split b is recommended with probability pM ;
whereas war takes place with probability 1 − pM , leading to the payoff of θ/2. When the
opponent is a hawk, the split 1/2 is recommended with probability pH , and war occurs with
probability 1− pH yielding payoff of (1− p) θ.
Similarly, for the hawk, the constraint
(1− q) ((1− pM)pθ + pMb) + q ((1− pH)θ/2 + pH/2) ≥
(1− q) ((1− pL)pθ + pL/2) + q ((1− pM)θ/2 + pM(1− b))
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must hold, where the left-hand side is the payoff for truthfully revealing the type, and the
right-hand side is the expected payoff from ‘hiding strength.’
The ex interim participation constraints (for the dove and the hawk, respectively) are:
(1− q) (pL/2 + (1− pL) θ/2) + q (pM (1− b) + (1− pM) (1− p) θ) ≥ (1− q) θ/2 + q (1− p) θ,
(1− q) (pMb+ (1− pM) pθ) + q (pH/2 + (1− pH) θ/2) ≥ (1− q) pθ + qθ/2.
Again the left-hand sides are the dove and the hawk’s payoffs when accepting the arbitration
and truthfully revealing their types. Evidently, they coincide with the left-hand sides of the
incentive compatibility constraints. The right hand sides are now the payoffs for refusing
arbitration and triggering war. The player meets a dove with probability 1 − q, obtaining
payoff θ/2 if it is a dove and pθ if it is a hawk, whereas it meets a hawk with probability q, in
which case its payoff is (1− p) θ if the player is a dove and θ/2 if it is a hawk.17
We now report the main features of the arbitration solution.
Proposition 1 The solution of the optimal arbitration program is such that, for λ < γ,
1. When delivered the arbitrator’s decisions, the players’ types become common knowledge;
2. The incentive compatibility constraint of the low type and the participation constraint of
the high type always bind, the other constraints do not;
3. For λ < γ/2, so that the chance of a hawk opponent is low, dove dyads do not fight
(pL = 1), asymmetric dyads fight with positive probability (0 < pM < 1), hawk dyads
always fight (pH = 0), and the arbitrators recommendations are self-enforcing (b = pθ);
4. For γ > λ > γ/2, so that the chance of a hawk opponent is intermediate, dove dyads
and asymmetric dyads do not fight (pL = 1 and pM = 1), hawk dyads fight with posi-
17Although these constraints are not linear because of the products pM b, they can be turned into linear
constraints by changing the variable b with pB = pM b and the constraint 1/2 ≤ b ≤ 1 with pB ≤ pM ≤ 2pB.
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tive probability pH ∈ (0, 1) , and the arbitrators recommendations are not self enforcing
(1/2 < b < pθ).
We now elaborate on the characterization described above.
First, the decisions delivered by the arbitrator reveal to each player the opponent’s type.
While the players do not know each other’s types when choosing whether to participate to the
arbitration or not, their types will be common knowledge after the arbitration is concluded. In
fact, if the settlement is (1/2, 1/2) each player knows that the opponent has the same type as
its own. When the settlement is (b, 1− b) or (1− b, b) , each player knows that the opponent
has the opposite type, because b is different from 1/2.
Second, we see that the arbitrator never quits (leading to a conflict escalation) when both
players report low strength: pL = 1; intuitively, there is no need to punish self-reported doves
by quitting and triggering a conflict escalation, as they receive lower splits on average than if
reporting to be hawks.
Third, the incentive compatibility constraint for the low type is always binding, because on
average hawks receive higher peaceful splits than doves. Given that the incentive to exaggerate
strength must be discouraged, there needs to be positive probability of war following a high
report. The most potent channel through which the low type’s incentive to exaggerate strength
can be kept in check is by quitting and instigating a conflict escalation whenever there are
two self-proclaimed high types (i.e., equivalently, the players’ demands cannot be reconciled).
When the odds ratio λ is low (few high types) it is indeed optimal to set pH = 0 and pM > 0,
whereas for higher values of λ, pH < 1 and pM = 1. When λ is sufficiently high, the likelihood
of a hawk is sufficiently high that instigating war against a dove is not needed to deter a dove
to exaggerate strength. But when λ is low, deterring misreporting by a dove requires having
self-reported hawks fight both against hawks and doves, with positive probability.
Fourth, when the odds ratio λ is low, the binding recommendation by the arbitrator is
also self-enforcing, because b = pθ. In fact, a high type is willing to accept the split b even
ex post, when knowing that the opponent is a dove. (If the opponent had been a hawk, the
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arbitrator’s settlement would have been 1/2). If it were to fight, its payoff against the dove
would be exactly pθ, so in fact the hawk is indifferent between fighting or not. But when the
odds ratio is high, the binding recommendation by the arbitrator is not self-enforcing, because
b < pθ. Upon realizing that the opponent is a dove, the hawk would like to not accept the
arbitrator’s decision and go to war against the dove.
3 Mediation
In the previous section, we have characterized the optimal solution for the case of third
party intervention by an arbitrator endowed with enforcement power. In this section, we
consider mediation: The third party’s prescriptions are not binding anymore.
The version of the revelation principle proved in Myerson (1982) guarantees that the
following game form entails no loss of generality, when representing mediation:
- After being informed of its type, each player i privately sends a report mi ∈ {l, h} to
the mediator.
- Given reportsm = (m1, m2), the mediator recommends a split (b, 1−b) according to some
cumulative distribution function F (b|m), where the only recommendation leading to war
in the support of F (·|m) is b = 0.18 Unlike the reports, the mediator’s recommendation
is public.
- Each one of the contestants separately decide whether to accept the mediator’s recom-
mended split. Unless they both agree, war takes place.
Again by the revelation principle, we may restrict attention to distributions F such that
the players reveal their type truthfully, and accept the mediator’s recommendation (unless
they are meant to lead to war) in equilibrium. This restriction imposes both ex interim
18Clearly all recommendations leading to war induce the same payoffs, and hence can be subsumed by the
recommendation b = 0.
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incentive compatibility constraints and ex post participation constraints, that are at least as
demanding as the incentive compatibility constraints and participation constraints required
by arbitration.
The reason for this is two fold. First, requiring each type of each player to participate
in an arbitration before knowing which settlement will be proposed is less demanding than
requiring them to agree to participate in each settlement that can be proposed on path by a
mediator. In principle, they may be willing to agree to some and not to others, but still be
better off in expectation by participating in the arbitration. Second, when entertaining the
possibility of not telling the truth in the mediation game, each type of player knows that it can
also deviate and trigger war after the mediator has proposed a peaceful settlement, whereas
this is impossible under arbitration. Also note that, because the constraints associated with
mediation are weakly more demanding than the arbitration’s constraints, the welfare achieved
under optimal mediation cannot be larger than the welfare achieved under optimal arbitration.
Turning to describing in details the constraints associated with mediation, to simplify nota-
tion, we restrict attention to mechanisms that are symmetric across players, where F (·|m1, m2) =
1 − F (·|m2, m1) for all (m1, m2), and to discrete distributions F. We shall later see that
this entails no loss of generality. Let Pr[m−i, b,mi] denote the equilibrium joint probabil-
ity that the players send messages (mi, m−i) and that the mediator offers (b, 1 − b), and set
Pr[b,mi] ≡ Pr[h, b,mi]+Pr[l, b,mi]. When player i is a hawk, it reports mi = h in equilibrium,
and ex post individual rationality requires that
bPr[b, h] ≥ Pr[l, b, h]pθ + Pr[h, b, h]θ/2, for all b ∈ (0, 1), (1)
which ensures that, if recommended the peaceful split b, i.e., for all b ∈ (0, 1) such that
Pr[b, h] > 0, the hawk prefers accepting the split b to starting a war and receiving payoff pθ
when the opponent is a dove —an event occurring with probability Pr[l, b, h]— and θ/2 when
the opponent is a hawk —which occurs with probability Pr[h, b, h].
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Similarly, when i is a dove, the ex post participation constraint dictates that
bPr[b, l] ≥ Pr[h, b, l](1− p)θ + Pr[l, b, l]θ/2, for all b ∈ (0, 1). (2)
Ex interim incentive compatibility requires that, when player i is a hawk, it truthfully reports
mi = h. The associated constraint dictates that
qF (0|h, h)θ/2 + (1− q)F (0|h, l)pθ +
∫ 1
0
bdF (b|h) ≥ qF (0|l, h)θ/2 +
(1− q)F (0|l, l)pθ +
∫ 1
0
max{b,Pr[l|b, l]pθ + Pr[h|b, l]θ/2}dF (b|l), (3)
where Pr[m−i|b,mi] = Pr[m−i, b,mi]/Pr[b,mi] whenever Pr[b,mi] > 0, and F (·|mi) ≡ qF (·|mi, h)+
(1−q)F (·|mi, l), for mi and m−i taking values l and h. The left-hand side is the hawk’s payoff
if reporting truthfully to the mediator. The hawk obtains payoff θ/2 when meeting a hawk
(which occurs with probability q), if war takes place —an event of probability F (0|h, h). It
obtains the payoff pθ when meeting a dove and war takes place, and event of joint probabil-
ity (1− q)F (0|h, l) . The expected value of a peaceful b depends on the distribution F (b|h)
and is thus the third term on the left hand side. The right hand side similarly displays the
expected payoff when deviating and pretending to be a dove. The first two terms display the
expected payoff in case of war. With joint probability qF (0|l, h) the opponent is a hawk and
war erupts, and the payoff is θ/2; whereas with probability (1 − q)F (0|l, l) war erupts with
a dove, leading to a payoff of pθ. The third term represents the expected payoff when the
mediator prescribes a peaceful split b. Note that when a player i contemplates deviating at
the report stage, it also anticipates and takes into account that it might prefer to declare war
ex post, even when the mediator recommends a peaceful solution. This fact is reflected by
the maximum operator in the third term on the right hand side of the above inequality: the
player may choose whether to accept a peaceful proposal b or go to war, again with expected
payoff Pr[l|b, l]pθ + Pr[h|b, l]θ/2. If instead the mediator quits and players fight, the player is
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left with no choice but to fight, as it anticipates that this will be the equilibrium strategy of
the opponent.
To ensure truth-telling by player i when a dove, the following constraint must be satisfied:
qF (0|lh)(1− p)θ + (1− q)F (0|ll)θ/2 +
∫ 1
0
(1− b)dF (b|l) ≥ qF (0|hh)(1− p)θ +
(1− q)F (0|lh)θ/2 +
∫ 1
0
max{1− b,Pr[l|b, h]θ/2 + Pr[h|b, h](1− p)θ}dF (b|h). (4)
In the best equilibrium, the mediator seeks to minimize the probability of war, i.e.,
(1− q)2F (0|hh) + 2q(1− q)F (0|lh) + q2F (0|ll).
Because recommendations must be self-enforcing, there is a priori no reason to restrict the
mediator in the number of splits to which he assigns positive probability. In fact, recommen-
dations convey information about the most likely opponents’ revealed types, and it might be
in the mediator’s best interest to scramble such information by means of multiple recommen-
dations. Nevertheless, Proposition 2 below shows that relatively simple mechanisms reach the
maximum probability of peace among all possible mechanisms, including asymmetric ones.
These simple mechanisms can be described as follows. Given reports (h, h), the mediator rec-
ommends the peaceful split (1/2, 1/2) with probability qH , and war with probability 1 − qH .
Given reports (h, l), the mediator recommends the peaceful split (1/2, 1/2) with probability
qM , the split (b, 1− b) with probability pM , and war with probability 1− pM − qM , for some
b ≥ 1/2. Given reports (l, l), the mediator recommends the peaceful split (1/2, 1/2) with prob-
ability qL, the splits (b, 1− b) and (1− b, b) with probability pL each, and war with probability
1− 2pL − qL.
Again, we relegate the explicit formulas of the solution to the Appendix, and restrict
ourselves here to the description of its main features.
Proposition 2 A solution to the mediator’s problem is such that, for all λ < γ:
15
1. Both the low-type incentive compatibility constraint and the high-type participation con-
straint bind (b = pθ);
2. For λ > γ/2, doves do not fight (qL+2pL = 1); hawk dyads fight with positive probability,
qH ∈ (0, 1), asymmetric dyads do not fight (pM+2qM = 1) and the mediator recommends
both the splits (b, 1− b) and (1/2, 1/2) with positive probability (qM > 0 and pM > 0);
3. For λ ≤ γ/2, doves do not fight —qL + 2pL = 1, asymmetric dyads fight with positive
probability —qM = 0, pM ∈ (0, 1) , whereas hawk dyads always fight, qH = 0;
4. For γ < 1, the mediator assigns the unequal splits (pθ, 1− pθ) and (1− pθ, pθ) to dove
dyads with strictly positive probability (pL > 0).
We now comment on the solution, discussing informally the optimal mediator’s techniques
uncovered by the above Proposition.
As in the arbitration solution, doves never fight among each other. Again, this is because
the mediator finds no need for quitting when the players reports being doves. Further, the
low-type incentive compatibility constraint binds, because on average hawks receive higher
peaceful splits than doves. Again, this leads the mediator to need to punish self-reported
hawks by quitting and triggering war. Again, when the chance of facing a hawk is high,
λ > γ/2, this is done by making hawk dyads fight, without the need to make asymmetric
dyads fight.
However, there is a major difference with respect to optimal arbitration. When not quitting
and triggering war, the mediator does not assign the unequal split (b, 1− b) with probability
one to (H,L) asymmetric dyads in which the first player is a hawk. With probability qM > 0,
she assigns the equal split (1/2, 1/2) instead. This is equivalent to not reporting to the hawk
that the opponent is a dove, because the split (1/2, 1/2) is the one assigned to dyads in which
both players are hawks.
This obfuscation strategy obtains to lower the reward for a dove from mimicking a hawk,
hence it lowers the incentive to exaggerate strength. When achieving a peaceful split against
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a dove, a self reported hawk need not achieve the payoff pθ and may get 1/2 instead. This
obfuscation is possible, when λ > γ/2, because when two hawks meet and are assigned the
equal split (1/2, 1/2) , they have a strict incentive not to fight. Hence, they will still have a
incentive not to fight, even after the mediator mixes to obfuscate them.
The obfuscation is needed when λ > γ/2 because unlike the arbitrator, the mediator
cannot force the hawk to accept an unequal split b < pθ when facing a dove. In fact, the
ex post participation constraint of the hawk b ≥ pθ cannot be violated. Hence, the mediator
needs to circumvent this constraint by obfuscating the hawk meeting a dove. By doing so,
she lowers the expected payoff of the hawk when meeting a dove below pθ.
When the chance of facing a hawk is low, λ ≤ γ/2, the mediator (like the arbitrator)
ensures that doves do not self report that they are hawk by making both hawk dyads and
asymmetric dyads fight with positive probability. Noting that, for this parameter range, it
is the case that b = pθ for both the optimal mediation and the optimal arbitration solution,
leads to the interesting result that optimal mediation and optimal arbitration coincide, as long
as λ ≤ γ/2 and γ ≥ 1, i.e., when the benefit cost ratio for war is sufficiently large. Because
b = pθ for both the optimal mediation and the optimal arbitration solution, it turns out that
in this parameter region there is no room for obfuscation.
However, even when λ ≤ γ/2 as well as when λ > γ/2, there is a noticeable difference
between optimal mediation and the optimal arbitration when γ < 1. In this case, the mediator
needs to obfuscate the players who report to be dove, by choosing one at random and not
reporting that the opponent is a dove. The mediator does this by sending either one of the
unequal reports (b, 1− b) to dove dyads. This obfuscation strategy is used to keep in check the
incentive for a hawk to pretend that it is a dove and hide strength. In fact, such a hawk can
improve its payoff by further deviating from the mediator’s prescription and waging war, in
the case where the mediator’s settlement reveals that the opponent is a dove. By obfuscating
the self-reported dove and not revealing that it is facing a dove, the mediator keeps in check
the benefit for this ‘double-deviation’ strategy.
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Evidently, this double deviation is impossible with arbitration. There, players cannot de-
viate after being delivered the arbitrator’s decision. Because the value of this double deviation
is particularly high when γ < 1, i.e., the benefit of war is small relative to the cost, this case
is when the mediator needs to adopt this obfuscation strategy.
Having explained in detail the main qualitative features of optimal mediation, we can now
precisely answer the first set of questions presented in the introduction:
• What are the optimal mediation strategies?
1. When the odds ratio of hawks is sufficiently large, the mediator does not always give
the lion’s share to a declared hawk facing a dove (or, equivalently does not always
reveal to a self-reported hawk that it is facing a dove). This lowers the reward for a
dove from mimicking a hawk, hence it lowers the incentive to exaggerate strength
and achieve a favorable peace settlement with a dove.
2. When the benefit/cost ratio of declaring war is small, the mediator offers with
some probability unequal split to two parties reporting low type (or, equivalently
the mediator does not always reveal to a dove that it is facing a dove). This lowers
the incentive to doubly deviate: hide strength and fight if finding out that the
opponent is a dove.
Turning to comparing the peace probability under optimal mediation and under optimal
arbitration, surprisingly, we find that they are the same.19 Specifically, for λ ≤ γ/2, the
mechanisms with and without enforcement coincide. When λ > γ/2, the simplest optimal
mechanism with enforcement is such that b < pθ, which is not self-enforcing. But the optimal
mechanism without enforcement obfuscates the players’ reports, and this obfuscation succeeds
in fully circumventing the enforcement problem.
19This result facilitates the proof of Proposition 2. It is enough to establish that the simple mechanism
characterized there, and described in closed form in the Appendix, satisfies the more stringent constraints of
the mediator’s program. Because this mechanism achieves the same welfare as the solution to the arbitration
problem, it must be optimal, a fortiori, in the mediator’s program.
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Proposition 3 An arbitrator who can enforce recommendations is exactly as effective in pro-
moting peace as a mediator who can only propose self-enforcing agreements.
The intuition is as follows. First, note that the dove’s ex interim incentive compatibility
constraint and hawk’s ex interim participation constraint are the only ones binding in the
solution of the arbitrator’s program. Conversely, the only binding constraints in the mediator’s
program with self-enforcing recommendations are the dove’s incentive compatibility constraint
and the ex post hawk’s participation constraints b ≥ pθ. Recall that, in our solution, the
hawk is always indifferent between war and peace if recommended a peaceful settlement.
Further, the dove’s incentive compatibility constraint in the mediator’s problem with self-
enforcing recommendations is identical to the dove’s incentive compatibility constraint in
the arbitrator’s program, because a dove never wages war after exaggerating strength in the
solution of mediator’s problem with self-enforcing recommendations.
Further, the hawk’s ex interim participation constraint integrates the two binding hawk’s
ex post participation constraints in the arbitrator’s problem. While requiring a constraint
to hold in expectation is generally a weaker requirement than having the two constraints, it
turns out that the induced welfare is the same. This is easiest to see when λ ≤ γ/2, as in
this case the only settlement ever granted to a hawk is b, when the opponent is dove. For
any mechanism with this property, the ex interim participation and the ex post participation
constraints trivially coincide. Let us now consider the case λ > γ/2. In this case, the optimal
truthful arbitration mechanism prescribes a settlement b < pθ that does not satisfy the ex
post participation constraint of a hawk meeting a dove, as well as prescribing a settlement
with slack, equal to 1/2, to same type dyads. The mediator cannot reproduce this mechanism.
But she circumvents the problem with the obfuscation strategy whereby the hawk is made
exactly indifferent between war and peace when recommended either the split 1/2 or the split
b = pθ. Hence, she optimally rebalances the ex post participation constraints so as to achieve
the same welfare as the arbitrator.
Specifically, we find that the mediator chooses pM and qM optimally so that the expected
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payoff of a hawk meeting a dove under mediation, pM ·pθ+qM ·1/2, is exactly equal to the split
imposed by a mediator to a hawk meeting a dove, b ∈ (1/2, pθ) . The fact that this can be done
follows exactly from the fact that b lies between 1/2 and pθ and that pM and qM can be chosen
so as to sum up to one when λ > γ/2. Evidently, the hawk’s payoff when meeting a hawk
can be made to coincide under mediation and arbitration, as there is no issue of enforcement
there. For the same reason, the dove interim payoff can be made the same under mediation
and under arbitration. These arguments conclude that the mediator’s obfuscation strategy
achieves the same equilibrium interim payoff for both types. Now, we note that mediation
is not more restrictive than arbitration at the interim stage: all the differences are induced
by the additional ex post stage. Hence, a consequence of the interim payoff equality between
mediation and arbitration is the fact that these two institutions achieve the same welfare.
We can now answer the second question that we posed in the introduction.
• How do mediation and arbitration differ in terms of conflict resolution?
– In our game, there is no difference in terms of optimal ex ante probability of peace
between the two institutions.
– Unless the chance of meeting a hawk is intermediate, the two optimal mechanisms
coincide. When they do not coincide, the mediator’s optimal obfuscation strategy
fully circumvents the mediator’s lack of enforcement power.
4 The importance of obfuscation
To assess the importance of obfuscation and shuttle diplomacy, we now solve the medi-
ation problem by making obfuscation impossible, and forcing the mediator to report all the
information she gathered by the disputants. We call this form of mediation communication
facilitation, because the only role of the mediator is to facilitate communication among the
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two disputants, without hiding any of the information that she is given by the disputants.20
For comparability with optimal mediation, we adopt the same game form that we consid-
ered in the previous section. So, again, after privately learning its type, each player i sends
a message mi ∈ {l, h} to the facilitator, who reveals them to the players and makes a recom-
mendation (x, 1− x) on the basis of the messages m = (m1, m2) and possibly randomizing.
With probability 1− p(m), the facilitator instigates war; with probability p (m), she chooses
a peaceful split x (m) . To make facilitated communication comparable with the full fledged
model of mediation in the previous section, which includes the possibility of shuttle diplomacy,
we restrict attention to pure-strategy equilibria of this game in which players report truthfully
their type, i.e., to separating equilibria. Further we focus on equilibria with peaceful splits
x (m) and probabilities p (m) that are symmetric across players. Such symmetry restriction
entails that x(h, h) = x(l, l) = 1/2, and that we only need to find another split value, i.e.,
b ≡ x(h, l) = 1 − x(l, h), given that the message space contains only two elements. We here
let pL ≡ p(l, l), pH ≡ p(h, h) and pM ≡ p(h, l) = p(l, h).
Before proceeding with the analysis, we briefly comment on the characteristics of our model
of communication facilitation. In fact, because this type of mediator reports all information
gathered by disputants, we observe that this mechanism can also be understood as a form
of unmediated communication. Specifically, the communication to the facilitator can also be
understood as direct cheap talk among the players. Further, the possibly randomized recom-
mendation by the facilitator can be understood just as a public correlation random device.
Following Aumann and Hart (2003), such a public device can be replicated by an additional
round of communication (using so-called jointly controlled lotteries). Hence our game can be
reformulated as a two-round communication game without any third party involvement.
For the sake of comparability with the mediation program in the previous section, we
do not consider the possibility of further rounds of cheap talk.21 The restriction to binary
20See Annex 2 of the WTO Legal Texts as an example of communication facilitation procedures with full
transparency.
21This might help, however. Aumann and Hart (2003) provide examples of games in which longer, indeed
unbounded, communication protocols improve upon finite round communication.
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messages is natural given the binary type space. When focusing on pure-strategy equilibria,
these two restrictions are without loss of generality. But it is possible that more rounds or
larger message sets might help in mixed-strategy equilibria (although numerical optimization
shows that expanding the message space by allowing one more message, or allowing one more
round of cheap talk does not help in our game).22 On the other hand, it can be shown that
the restriction to a single peaceful split x (m), for every m, rather than the consideration of a
lottery over peaceful splits, is without loss of generality.23
Evidently, by the version of the revelation principle of Myerson (1982), we know that any
unmediated communication protocol cannot outperform the mediation mechanism we studied
in the previous section. In general, communication facilitation will yield a lower welfare than
mediation. We will nevertheless show that the communication facilitation protocol we study
here can match mediation’s welfare when the cost of war is low relative to the potential benefit
and when the chances of meeting a hawk is low (specifically, this occurs when γ < λ/2 and
γ ≥ 1).




(1− q)2(1− pL) + 2q(1− q)(1− pM) + q
2(1− pH)
subject to the following ex post participation constraints and ex interim incentive compati-
bility constraints. First, reporting truthfully must be optimal. For the dove, this incentive
22Indeed, there exist games in which restricting the cardinality of the message space could play a role when
considering mixed strategies. For example, Bester and Strausz (2000) study a mechanism design problem with
a principal and two agents. The principal cannot commit to implement the mechanism recommendations.
Because of this, they show that the principal can improve the optimal mixed strategy equilibrium, by asking
agents to send a message out of a space with a larger cardinality than their type space. See also Bester and
Strausz (2001) and (2007) on mechanism design when the principal cannot commit to the mechanism.
23Note that we can replace without loss any lottery over peaceful recommendations with its certainty
equivalent. In fact, at the agreement stage, the requirement that the players accept such a deterministic
average split is less stringent than the requirement that they accept all splits in the support of the lottery.
Further, lotteries over peaceful splits affect each player’s equilibrium payoff at the communication stage only
through their expectations. Finally, the payoff of a player who deviates at the communication stage is convex
in the recommended split, as we shall later see. Hence, the deviation payoff is lower when replacing a lottery
with its certainty equivalent, thus making the equilibrium requirement less stringent.
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compatibility constraint states that
(1− q) ((1− pL)θ/2 + pL/2) + q ((1− pM)(1− p)θ + pM(1− b)) ≥
(1− q) ((1− pM)θ/2 + pM max{b, θ/2}) + q ((1− pH)(1− p)θ + pH max{1/2, (1− p)θ}) .
The left-hand side is the dove’s equilibrium payoff. With probability 1 − q, the opponent is
also a dove, in which case the equal split 1/2 occurs with probability pL and the payoff from
war, θ/2, is collected with probability (1− pL) . With probability q, the opponent is hawk.
With probability pM , this leads to the split 1 − b, and with probability 1 − pM to the payoff
from war (1− p) θ. The right-hand side is the expected payoff from exaggerating strength.
When the opponent is a dove, the split b is recommended with probability pM . In principle,
the player may deviate from the recommendation, and collect the war payoff θ/2, hence the
payoff is max {b, θ/2} .24 Further, war takes place with probability 1−pM . When the opponent
is a hawk, the split 1/2 is recommended with probability pH , and war occurs with probability
1− pH . Similarly, for the hawk, the incentive compatibility constraint
(1− q) ((1− pM)pθ + pMb) + q ((1− pH)θ/2 + pH/2) ≥
(1− q) ((1− pL)pθ + pL max{1/2, pθ}) + q ((1− pM)θ/2 + pM max{1− b, θ/2}) ,
must hold, where the left-hand side is the equilibrium payoff and the right-hand side is the
expected payoff from hiding strength.
Second, players must find it optimal to accept all peaceful splits. Given that, in a sepa-
rating equilibrium, messages reveal types, this requires that
b ≥ pθ, 1− b ≥ (1− p)θ.
24Because of the maxima on the right-hand side of the incentive compatibility constraints, as anticipated
in footnote 23, the payoff of a player who deviates at the communication stage is strictly convex in the
recommended split b, instead of linear in b.
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That is, a hawk facing a self-proclaimed dove must get a share b that makes war unprofitable
against a dove. Similarly, the dove’s share against a hawk cannot be so low that it is better
to go to war. The constraint that a player would accept an equal split when the opponent’s
type is the same as its own, 1/2 > θ/2, is always satisfied.
Solving this program yields the following characterization. The complete equilibrium spec-
ification is tedious and relegated to the Appendix.
Proposition 4 A solution of the facilitated communication program is such that, for λ < γ:
1. The dove’s incentive compatibility constraint binds;
2. If γ ≥ 1 and/or λ ≥ (1 + γ)−1, then the hawk’s incentive compatibility constraint does
not bind and b = pθ; and further:
• if λ < γ/2, then hawk dyads always fight, pH = 0, asymmetric dyads fight with
positive probability, pM ∈ (0, 1) and doves do not fight, pL = 1; the mediation and
facilitation mechanisms coincide;
• if λ ≥ γ/2 (which covers also the case λ ≥ (1 + γ)−1), then hawk dyads fight
with positive probability, pH ∈ (0, 1) , dove and asymmetric dyads do not fight,
pM = pL = 1; further, shuttle diplomacy strictly improves welfare over facilitated
communication;
3. If γ < 1 and λ < (1 + γ)−1, then the hawk’s incentive compatibility constraint binds
and b > pθ; and further pH = 0, pM ∈ (0, 1) and pL = 1 for λ < γ/(1 + γ), whereas
pH ∈ (0, 1) and pM = pL = 1 otherwise as above; further, shuttle diplomacy strictly
improves welfare over facilitated communication.
Elaborating on this characterization, we first find, again, that war is never optimal among
doves (pL = 1) and that, again, the truth-telling constraint for the low type is always binding.
As in the case of mediation, the facilitator achieves this by setting set pH = 0 and pM > 0
when λ is low (few high types), whereas for higher values of λ, she sets pH < 1 and pM = 1.
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Now, suppose that γ ≥ 1, so that the cost of war is low. Then the ex post participation con-
straint always binds, and hence b = pθ; and the ex interim high-type truth-telling constraint
never binds. This is because, when the cost of war is low, the hawk hiding strength always
prefers to wage war (both against hawks and doves). Whether shuttle diplomacy improves
upon facilitated communication or not depends on whether λ > γ/2 or λ ≤ γ/2. Recall that
when γ > 1 and λ > γ/2, then the mediator sometimes recommends the equal split (1/2, 1/2)
when one player reports to be a hawk, and the other claims to be a dove. Evidently, this
strategy is unfeasible under facilitated communication, and shuttle diplomacy improves the
chances of peace. When λ ≤ γ/2 instead, shuttle diplomacy does not improve upon facilitated
communication because there is no obfuscation in optimal mediation.
Finally, suppose that γ < 1, so that the cost of war is high. For λ ≤ 1/(1 + γ), in the
best equilibrium of the facilitated communication game, the high-type truth-telling constraint
binds, and b > pθ, unlike in the case of mediation. To see why, suppose by contradiction that
b = pθ. For γ < 1, this would imply that 1 − b > θ/2. Consider a hawk pretending to be a
dove. If it meets a dove, its payoff is the same as if revealing to be a hawk, because it can
secure the payoff pθ by waging war. If it meets a hawk, it gets 1 − b with probability pM
and θ/2 with probability 1 − pM . By revealing to be a hawk, it gets 1/2 with probability
pH and θ/2 with probability 1 − pH against a hawk. But we know that pM is larger than
pH , and because 1 − b > θ/2, the hawk would prefer to pretend to be a dove, violating the
incentive compatibility constraint. To make sure that all constraints are satisfied, we must
have b > pθ, so as to reduce the payoff from pretending to be a dove, as the split b is proposed
for self-reported hawks. As a result, when λ ≤ 1/(1+γ), the high-type incentive compatibility
constraint binds, whereas the high type participation constraint b ≥ pθ does not.25
In contrast with the case of γ ≥ 1, shuttle diplomacy always yields a strict welfare im-
25To see why b = pθ when λ ∈ [1/(1 + γ), γ], even if γ < 1, note that pH increases in λ, as in the case
where γ ≥ 1. Because the incentive to hide strength decreases as pH increases relative to pM , we can reduce
b as λ increases. When λ reaches the threshold 1/(1 + γ), the offer b required for the hawk truth-telling
constraint to bind is exactly pθ. Further increasing λ cannot induce a further decrease in b, because the ex
post participation constraint b ≥ pθ becomes binding. So in the region where λ ∈ [1/(1 + γ), γ], the incentive
compatibility constraint does not bind and b = pθ.
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provement when γ < 1. When λ > 1/(1 + γ), so that b = pθ in the perfectly separating
equilibrium of the facilitated communication game, it is also the case that λ > γ/2 (note that
1/ (1 + γ) > γ/2), and hence the mediator improves over the facilitator for the same reasons
as when γ ≥ 1. When γ < 1 and λ < 1/ (1 + γ), unlike with facilitated communication, the
mediator makes sure that the high-type incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied with
b = pθ. In fact, recall that the mediator offers (b, 1 − b) with positive probability when both
players report to be doves. A hawk who is hiding strength, and who is offered 1 − b believes
that the opponent is most likely a hawk, and does not wage war. This reduces the above
described incentive to hide strength in order to wage war if revealed that the opponent is
weak.
We can now answer the final set of questions asked in the introduction.
• When does obfuscation matter, and how?
– When the conflict is expected to be very costly or intense and the proportion of
hawks is intermediate, shuttle diplomacy strictly improves upon facilitated com-
munication by obfuscating communication to hawks when they are paired with
doves.
– When the conflict is expected to be very costly or intense and the the proportion
of hawks is either low, or high, the separating equilibrium of the facilitated com-
munication game exactly reproduces mediation and arbitration. They all yield the
same welfare.
– When the intensity and/or cost of conflict is high, shuttle diplomacy strictly im-
proves welfare compared to facilitated communication by obfuscating communica-
tion to self-reported doves when paired with doves.
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5 Evidence on Commitment
One of the main assumptions of our model is the mediator’s commitment to lead to a
conflict escalation if this is prescribed by the optimal solution. In the real world, this translates
into the mediator’s commitment to quit and terminate the mediation, at least with some
probability, when the disputants’ demands cannot be reconciled. In this section we provide
two types of evidence that mediators in the real world are capable of keeping this commitment,
and even that disputants prefer having a mediator with a credible reputation of being able
to keep this commitment. The first type of evidence is from a data set that has settlement
attempts as units of observation, namely the Issue Correlates of War dataset (ICOW), by
Hensel et al (2008). The second type of evidence will be from an illustrative case study.
In fact, mediators often make clear to the disputants under which circumstances they will
quit. Such contingent plans of action often include deadlines. According to Avi Gil, one of the
key architects of the Oslo peace process, “A deadline is a great but risky tool. Great because
without a deadline it’s difficult to end negotiations. [The parties] tend to play more and more,
because they have time. Risky because if you do not meet the deadline, either the process
breaks down, or deadlines lose their meaning” (Watkins, 1998). Among the many cases in
which this technique was used, see for instance Curran and Sebenius (2003)’s account of how
a deadline was employed by former Senator George Mitchell in the Northern Ireland negoti-
ations. Committing to such deadlines might be somewhat easier for professional mediators
whose reputation is at stake, but they have been also used both by unofficial and official indi-
viduals, including Pope John Paul II and former U.S. President Jimmy Carter.26 Meanwhile,
institutions like the United Nations increasingly set time limits to their involvement upfront
(see, for instance, the U.N. General Assembly report, 2000).
26Bebchik (2002) describes how Clinton and Ross attempted to impress upon Arafat the urgency of accepting
the proposal being offered for a final settlement, calling it a “damn good deal” that would not be within his
grasp indefinitely.
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5.1 Evidence from settlement attempts data
The ICOW data set considers each settlement attempt as a distinct observation.27 The
key source of variation is whether mediators resume the mediation process through a new
settlement attempt following failure or whether they withdraw for good. The theory assumes
the mediator’s commitment to withdraw from mediation, expecting that this condition is
essential to successful mediation. Mediation attempts in the presence of commitment to quit
should be expected to be more successful, and mediators with such a reputation more sought
after to serve as a mediator compared to mediators that cannot commit to quit. We probe
the ICOW data for information that is consistent with these two hypotheses.
To ascertain whether these patterns exist, we construct rough indicators of mediation ter-
mination and differentiate cases according to the circumstances under which they terminated.
The settlement attempt may end with 1) an agreement fully implemented; 2) an agreement
reached but not ratified by at least one party; 3) an agreement reached and ratified but not
complied with by at least one party; 4) no agreement reached and/or escalation of violent
hostilities.28 We say a mediator has “quit” if the mediator does not initiate a new mediation
attempt involving the same two primary disputants within at least 10 years of the end of
the mediation failure. We consider this a “responsive quit” if the settlement attempt ended
under any conditions 2–4. A non trivial proportion of failed mediation attempts satisfy this
criteria and a significant portion of the mediators in the sample will have quit at least once.
Mediators who have established a reputation for actually following through on commitments
to withdraw from the process in response to disputant transgressions should be considered
more effective mediators and therefore should be more likely to be invited as a mediator in
future settlement attempts.
27We use ICOW instead of other datasets because it’s level of analysis is appropriate for our purposes. The
International Crisis Bargaining dataset (ICB), Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997 and 2000) for example, would
not be useful because it collapses all settlement attempts for each crisis into one observation.
28We use two alternative definitions of agreement, leading to quit1 and quit2 variables, but they lead to
very similar results.
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Variable frequency Rel. Frequency (total) Rel. Frequency (failed)
quit1 38 28.4% (134 total) 41.8% (91 total)
quit2 39 29.1% (134 total) 41.5% (94 total)
Table 1 describes how frequently mediators quit in the sample of 134 mediation attempts
present in the ICOW dataset. The relative frequency of quitting in the panel varies slightly
based on the definition of quitting used, which vary by how strict the criteria are for coding
the result as a responsive quit, but overall the data suggest that approximately 30% of the
mediation attempts resulted in the mediator quitting by our definition. Of failed mediation
attempts, mediators quit responsively in approximately 42% of cases. It is clear that mediators
do quit in a significant portion of cases in which quitting is called for.
Variable frequency Rel. Frequency (total)
Quit1 116 86.6% (134 total)
Quit2 116 86.6% (134 total)
Table 2 demonstrates that an overwhelming majority of mediators in the sample quit the
process (by our definition) at least once in their career. 116 of the 134 mediation attempts in
the data were mediated by a third party that had quit at least once previously in the panel.
This suggests mediators that demonstrate they will withdraw in response to belligerent trans-
gressions are those asked again to mediate crises. The imprecision of the measurement and the
limited variation does not allow us to claim that this is airtight evidence that the mediator’s
capability to credibly threaten to quit when appropriate is a key factor in determining the
mediator selection, but the evidence is at least consistent with the general perception that
the ability to commit we assume in our model is an important characteristic of real world
mediation.
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5.2 Illustrative Case Study: Kofi Annan in Kenya and Syria
When the contested December 2007 Kenyan Presidential election resulted in widespread
ethnic violence, threatening to escalate to full-scale civil war, the international community
rushed to establish peace-making efforts. After weeks of multiple uncoordinated mediation
attempts that failed to bring the disputants closer to a negotiated settlement, the African
Union appointed former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to head the Panel of Eminent
African Personalities, a coalition of political actors to bring about a solution to the escalating
violence. The most important pillar of Annan’s mediation strategy was the consolidation of the
disparate mediation efforts and interested third parties behind a single process. He demanded,
and received, assurances that the international community back the Panel’s efforts and refrain
from pedaling alternative or competing mediation attempts. Throughout the negotiations,
Annan constantly devised signals to communicate the lack of alternative negotiating channels
to the disputants in order to ensure their engagement with the Panel’s efforts and proposals.
While working hard to overcome the challenges associated with bridging the bargaining
gap separating Kibaki and Odinga, Annan also made a point early on to communicate to
the disputants that the Panel would not remain involved indefinitely. As the pace of progress
slowed, Annan reiterated that he ‘would not be available forever and that an alternative had to
be found’ (Lindenmayer and Kaye, 2009). When the two sides began stalling for time, refusing
to make meaningful concessions on the political issue, Annan announced a suspension of the
talks. In an interview with the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Griffiths (2008), Annan
described the motivation for his decision:
“...Look, this is getting nowhere, so I’ve decided I’m suspending talks.” ...“I had done my
duty and believed the leaders should do theirs.”
Annan clearly used the suspension of the mediation process, and the threat of its termi-
nation, to coerce the parties into giving up more than they hoped at the bargaining table.
He even went so far to strengthen his signal by suggesting his successor, Cyril Ramaphosa of
South Africa. Kibaki and the PNU vehemently rejected this proposed replacement, claiming
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Ramaphosa to be partial to Odinga’s claim. But nevertheless, the signal seems to have been
perceived as credible, as the disputants increased the urgency with which they engaged with
the Panel’s peace-making process (Lindenmayer and Kaye 2009).
Annan’s commitment to withdraw from mediation in the event the parties refused to
abide by his negotiating plan was a calculated complement to his demand to consolidate
the international community behind one mediation process. These two tactics served the
strategy to remove the disputants’ ability to shop around for alternative mediators and conflict
resolution avenues, leaving them with the option of following Annan’s lead or continuing a
fight neither side wanted. This strategy fit the crisis well because it was clear that both
parties wanted to end the conflict, but that the possibility of alternative means to attain their
political goals tempted them away from conceding too much at the negotiating table.
Despite a mixed record of success (failure in Rwanda and Bosnia; success in Kenya),
Annan was asked again to step into the mediator’s role as Special Envoy for the U.N and
the Arab League in Syria’s escalating civil war. One of the prominent reasons cited for his
appointment was his recent success in Kenya. But, unlike in the Kenya case, in Syria Annan
faced a deeply divided international community. Though nominally unanimous in support of
Annan’s role and his six-point peace plan, the competing world powers almost immediately
took actions to undermine the mediation process. The U.S. and Western allies began arming
rebel forces and continued to call for Assad to step down while Russia and China continued to
prop up Assad’s regime. Without the international community united behind the process, the
situation deteriorated. Annan quit in response to continued escalation of violence and both
parties’ violation of the six-point plan. As such, Annan maintained his credibility to commit
to withdraw from his role in the event disputants become uncooperative.
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6 Concluding Remarks
By applying mechanism design techniques to the study of international conflict resolution,
this paper derives a number of lessons on mediation in international relations. Given the
sovereignty of States, it is often not feasible in international relations to rely on arbitration,
i.e., to give authority to a third party that would have enforcement power over the disputants.
Nonetheless, our first result is that an unbiased and completely uninformed mediator without
any enforcement power can achieve the exact same probability of peace that would be guaran-
teed by an optimal arbitration process with enforcement. The inability to enforce is effectively
replaced by an obfuscation strategy, which is however feasible only if the mediator operates
in a manner similar to what is called “shuttle diplomacy,”i.e., only when the mediator talks
to the disputants privately, reserving the right not to reveal all the information (s)he receives
from them.
Other forms of communication facilitation where the disputants communicate directly or
in any case there is full transparency in the mediation process, cannot achieve the same
outcome, because the obfuscation strategy is obviously ruled out by public communication.
The full transparency rules used in WTO settlement procedures (see WTO Legal Texts)
probably respond to a different objective function of the designer, but our paper shows that
such transparency rules, if applied to conflict resolution procedures, would not lead to ex ante
desirable outcomes, especially when the cost of conflict is very high and/or conflict is likely to
be indecisive. We have also shown that the availability of obfuscation strategies is particularly
relevant when the frequency of hawkish attitudes is intermediate, whereas when the likelihood
of hawkish attitudes is either very high or very low, then public communication may suffice.
Beside having clarified the relative appropriateness of different mediation institutions for
different international crisis contexts, a contribution of this paper has been to explicitly char-
acterize how does shuttle diplomacy achieve the same expected outcomes of arbitration. When
the ex ante chance of power asymmetry is high, the mediator lowers the reward from mimick-
ing a hawk by not always giving the lion’s share to a hawk facing a dove. When the expected
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intensity or cost of conflict are high, regardless of the expected degree of uncertainty, the
mediator reduces the temptation to hide strength by a strong player. The mediator’s strategy
is to lower the reward from mimicking a dove by sometimes giving an unequal split to two
parties reporting to be a low type.
The characterization of what shuttle diplomacy mediators should do, as well as the charac-
terization of the types of international crisis where such procedures dominate communication
facilitation with transparency, are all results that are obtained using the full commitment
assumption, used almost everywhere in the mechanism design literature. In section 5 we have
provided the available evidence that commitment to quit by mediators is indeed a significant
factor.
We conclude by noting that, while we have required recommendations to be self-enforcing,
they need not be renegotiation-proof, as they might be Pareto-dominated for the players. For
instance, when there is common belief that both players are hawks, they would be better off
settling for an equal split rather than going to war, although doing so is part of the solution.
Yet renegotiation-proofness does not seem to be a first and foremost concern of real world
mediators. It is not overly realistic to think that, after the mediator quits, contestants who
struggled to find an agreement in the presence of the mediator, will autonomously sit down
at the negotiation table again, in search for a Pareto improving agreement. Indeed, while the
literature on the causes of conflict underlines that contestants may not be able to individually
commit to peaceful conflict resolutions, it may well be the case that they can jointly or even
individually commit to belligerent resolutions, when such commitments are ex ante valuable.
Audience costs, for instance, are recognized to provide an important channel that makes war
threats credible (see, for instance, Tomz, 2007).29
29A technical difficulty for the analysis of renegotiation-proofness in our environment lies in the fact that
there is no widely accepted notion of renegotiation-proofness for games with incomplete information. The def-
initions that apply to our game usually yield non-existence, given the restriction imposed by ex post individual
rationality and incentive compatibility. Forges (1990), for instance, defines an equilibrium to be renegotiation-
proof if it is the case that, for every further (exogenous) proposal that players can simultaneously accept or
reject after the mediator’s recommendation, players would not unanimously prefer the exogenous proposal.
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Appendix A – Mediation
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof follows from this Lemma.




γ − 2λ+ 1
, pH = 0, and V =
(γ + 1)
(γ − 2λ+ 1) (λ+ 1)2
;
For λ ≥ γ/2,
pM = 1, pH =
2λ− γ
(γ − λ+ 1)λ
, and V =
γ + 1
(γ − λ+ 1) (λ+ 1)
.
Proof. We first solve the following relaxed program:
min
b,pL,pM ,pH
(1− q)2 (1− pL) + 2q (1− q) (1− pM) + q
2 (1− pH)
subject to high-type ex interim individual rationality:








































pL ≤ 1, pM ≤ 1 and pH ≥ 0.
First, note that pL = 1 in the solution because pL appears in the constraints only in
the right-hand side of the low-type ex interim incentive compatibility constraint, which is
increasing in pL. Second, note that the low-type ex interim incentive compatibility must be
binding in the relaxed program’s solution, or else one could increase pH thus reducing the value
of the objective function, without violating the high-type ex interim individual rationality
constraint. Third, note that the high-type ex interim individual rationality constraint must
be binding in the relaxed program’s solution, or else one could decrease b and make the
low-type ex interim incentive compatibility slack.
Solving for b and pH as a function of pM in the system defined by the low-type ex in-
terim incentive compatibility and high-type ex interim individual rationality constraints, and
plugging back the resulting expressions in the objective function, we obtain
C = −pM
γ + 1
(λ+ 1) (γ + 1− λ)
+K,
where K is an inconsequential constant. Hence, the probability of conflict is minimized by
setting pM = 1 whenever possible. Substituting pM = 1, in the system defined by the low-type
ex interim incentive compatibility and high-type ex interim individual rationality constraints,







q − θ − 4p2θ2 − 2pθ − 3qθ + 4pθ2 + 2qθ2 + 4p2qθ2 + 4pqθ − 6pqθ2 + 1
q + θ − 2pθ − 2qθ + 2pqθ
.
The quantity pH is strictly positive for λ ≥ γ/2 and always smaller than one. At the same
time 1/2 < b < pθ whenever λ ≥ γ/2.
Solving for b and pM as a function of pH in the system defined by the low-type ex in-
terim incentive compatibility and high-type ex interim individual rationality constraints, and
plugging back the resulting expressions in the objective function, we obtain
C =
(γ + 1)λ
(γ − 2λ+ 1) (λ+ 1)
pH +K,
where K is another inconsequential constant. The coefficient of pH is positive for λ ≤ γ/2,
hence the probability of conflict is minimized by setting pH = 0, which entails pM =
1
γ−2λ+1
and b = pθ. The quantity pM is strictly positive and smaller than one when λ ≤ γ/2.
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The proof of Lemma 1 and hence of Proposition 1 is concluded by showing that this
solution does not violate the high-type ex interim incentive compatibility and low-type ex
interim individual rationality constraints in the complete program.
Indeed, for λ ≥ γ/2, we verify that the slacks of these constraints are, respectively
1
2




(γ − λ+ 1)−1 (γ + 1) (1− θ) > 0.
Similarly, for λ ≤ γ/2, the slacks are
1
2




(γ + 1− 2λ)−1 (λ+ 1)−1 (γ + 1) (1− θ) > 0.
Proofs of Proposition 2 and 3. These results follow from this Lemma.
Lemma 2 A solution to the mediator’s problem is as follows.
• For λ ≤ γ/2,
qL + 2pL = 1, b = pθ, qH = qM = 0, pM =
1




(γ − 2λ+ 1) (γ − 1)
if γ ≥ 1, and pL ≥
(1− γ) λ
2γ2
(λ− γ) (γ + 2)
(λ− γ − 1)
if γ < 1;
with ex ante peace probability
V =
γ + 1
(1 + γ − 2λ)(1 + λ)2
.
• For λ ≥ γ/2,
qL+2pL = 1, pM+qM = 1, b = pθ, qH =
2λ− γ
λ(γ + 1− λ)
, qM =
2λ− γ
γ(γ + 1− λ)
, qL ≥
λ(2λ− γ)
γ2(γ − λ+ 1)
pL ≤ 2
(γ − λ) (γ + 2)λ
(γ − λ+ 1) γ (γ − 1)
if γ ≥ 1, and pL ≥
(1− γ)λ
2γ2
(λ− γ) (γ + 2)
(λ− γ − 1)
if γ < 1;
with ex ante peace probability
V =
γ + 1
(γ − λ+ 1) (λ+ 1)
.
Proof. Consider the general mechanisms subject to the ex post IR and ex interim IC* con-
straints (1)-(4). It is straightforward to observe that the ex post IR constraints constraints are
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stronger than the following (high-type and low-type, respectively) ex interim IR constraints
∫ 1
0
bdF (b|h) ≥ Pr[l, h]pθ + Pr[h, h]θ/2,
∫ 1
0
bdF (b|l) ≥ Pr[h, l](1− p)θ + Pr[l, l]θ/2, for all b ∈ [0, 1]
and that the ex interim IC* constraint are stronger than the ex interim IC constraint obtained
by substituting the maxima with their first argument (the interim payoff induced by accepting
peace recommendations later in the game).
By the revelation principle of Myerson (1979), the optimal ex ante probability of peace
within the class of mechanisms which satisfy these ex interim IC and IR constraints cannot
be larger than the ex ante probability of peace identified in Lemma 1 in Appendix D. Because
the ex interim IC and IR constraints are weaker than the ex interim IC* and ex post IR
constraints, it follows that any mechanism subject to the constraints (1)–(4) cannot yield a
higher ex ante probability of peace than the one identified in Lemma 1.
Hence, to prove the result, it is enough to show that the formulas for the choice variables
(b, pL, qL, pM , qM , qH) satisfy the constraints (1)-(4) and achieve the same ex ante probability
of peace as in Lemma 1. Specialized to the mechanisms described by (b, pL, qL, pM , qM , qH),
the ex post IR constraints take the following form, for the high type:
bpM ≥ pMpθ, (qqH + (1− q)qM) · 1/2 ≥ qqHθ/2 + (1− q)qMpθ,
and for the low type:
pLb ≥ pLθ/2, (qpM + (1− q)pL)(1− b) ≥ qpM(1− p)θ + (1− q)pLθ/2,
(qqM + (1− q)qL) · 1/2 ≥ qqM(1− p)θ + (1− q)qLθ/2,
whereas the high-type ex interim IC* constraint is
q(qH/2 + (1− qH)θ/2) + (1− q)(pMb+ qM/2 + (1− pM − qM)pθ) ≥
max{(qpM + (1− q)pL)(1− b), qpMθ/2 + (1− q)pLpθ}+max{(1− q)pLb, (1− q)pLpθ}
+max{(qqM + (1− q)qL) · 1/2, qqMθ/2 + (1− q)qLpθ}
+q(1− pM − qM)θ/2 + (1− q)(1− 2pL − qL)pθ,
and the low-type ex interim IC* constraint is
q(pM(1− b) + qM/2 + (1− pM − qM)(1− p)θ)




max{(1− q)pMb, (1− q)pM
θ
2




+q(1− qH)(1− p)θ + q(1− pM − qM)θ/2,
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It is straightforward to verify that the values provided in Lemma 2 are such that the ex ante
IC* constraint in which the low type does not wage war after misreporting is binding. Also,
plugging in our two sets of values for the choice variables gives the same welfare as in Lemma
1. We are left with showing that all other constraints are satisfied. We distinguish the two
cases.
Step 1. Suppose that λ < γ/2, so that qM = qH = 0. After simplification, the low-type IC*
constraint becomes
q(pM(1− pθ) + (1− pM)(1− p)θ) + (1− q) · 1/2 ≥
(1− q)pMpθ + q(1− p)θ + q(1− pM)θ/2,
which is binding for pM =
1
1+γ−2λ
. Consider the high-type IC* constraint
qθ/2 + (1− q)(pMb+ (1− pM)pθ) ≥ max{(qpM + (1− q)pL)(1− b), qpMθ/2 + (1− q)pLpθ}
+max{(1− q)pLb, (1− q)pLpθ}+max{(1− q)qL · 1/2, (1− q)qLpθ}+ q(1− pM)θ/2,
Note that
(qpM + (1− q)pL) (1− b) ≤ qpMθ/2 + (1− q)pLpθ,








for γ < 1, that
(1− q) pLb = (1− q) pLpθ
and that
(1− q)qL · 1/2 ≤ (1− q)qLpθ.
Then we substitute in the high-type IC* constraint (duly simplified):
qθ/2 + (1− q)(pMb+ (1− pM)pθ) ≥ qθ/2 + (1− q) pθ,
which is clearly satisfied because b = pθ.
Similarly, we find that the two high-type ex post constraints
pMb ≥ pMpθ, and (qqH + (1− q)qM) · 1/2 ≥ qqHθ/2 + (1− q)qMpθ
are satisfied — the second one because both sides equal zero.
We need to show that the low-type ex post constraints are satisfied. Indeed:
pLpθ > pLθ/2, (1− q)qL · 1/2 > (1− q)qLθ/2,
whereas
(qpM + (1− q)pL) (1− pθ) ≥ qpM(1− p)θ + (1− q)pLθ/2,





pM = 2λpM . So that if γ ≥ 1, pL ≤
2λ
(γ−2λ+1)(γ−1)




Finally the probability constraints are satisfied. In fact, 0 ≤ pM ≤ 1 requires only that
1 ≤ 1 + γ − 2λ, i.e., that λ ≤ γ/2.
41
Step 2. Suppose that λ ≥ γ/2. Consider the low-type constraint, first. After simplifying
maxima, as the low type always accepts the split if exaggerating strength, the low-type IC*








Then we consider the high-type IC* constraint. We proceed in two steps. We first deter-
mine the off-path behavior of the high type and show that
(qpM + (1− q)pL) · (1− b) ≤ qpMθ/2 + (1− q)pLpθ








for γ < 1, that
(1− q)pLb = (1− q)pLpθ
and that
(qqM + (1− q)qL) 1/2 ≤ qqMθ/2 + (1− q)qLpθ












Then we verify that the consequentially simplified high-type IC* constraint is satisfied








We then verify that the two high-type ex post constraints
pMb ≥ pMpθ, and (qqH + (1− q)qM) · 1/2 ≥ qqHθ/2 + (1− q)qMpθ








We then show that the low-type ex post constraints are satisfied. In fact
pLpθ > pLθ/2, and (qqM + (1− q)qL) · 1/2 > qqM(1− p)θ + (1− q)qLθ/2,
whereas
(qpM + (1− q)pL) (1− pθ) ≥ qpM(1− p)θ + (1− q)pLθ/2,





pM = 2λpM . So that if γ ≥ 1, pL ≤ 2
(γ−λ)(γ+2)λ
(γ−λ+1)γ(γ−1)




We then see that the probability constraints are satisfied. In fact, because γ + 1− λ > 0,
2λ− γ− λ(γ +1− λ) = (λ+ 1) (λ− γ) < 0, and 2λ− γ− γ(γ+1− λ) = (γ + 2) (λ− γ) , the
conditions 0 ≤ qH ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ qM ≤ 1 require only that 2λ− γ ≥ 0.
Finally, we verify by substitution that the equilibrium interim utility of high and low types
are the same in the arbitration and mediation programs. Importantly, this is so because we
verify that
pM · pθ + qM · 1/2 =
1
2
q − θ − 4p2θ2 − 2pθ − 3qθ + 4pθ2 + 2qθ2 + 4p2qθ2 + 4pqθ − 6pqθ2 + 1
q + θ − 2pθ − 2qθ + 2pqθ
,
where the right hand side is the expression for b ∈ (1/2, pθ) for the case of arbitration.
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As a consequence of the equality between equilibrium interim utility of high and low types,
the welfare is also the same across the two mechanisms, as can be directly verified.
Having proved that the claimed solution satisfies all constraints, the proof of Lemma 2,
and hence Propositions 2 and 3 is now concluded.
Appendix B - Unmediated Communication
Proof of Proposition 4 The proof follows from the following Lemma.
Lemma 3 The best separating equilibrium is characterized as follows.
1. Suppose that γ ≤ 1.
(a) When λ < γ/(1 + γ), both ex interim IC* constraints bind,
b > pθ, pH = 0, pM =
1
(1 + γ)(1− λ)
, and V =
1 + γ + λ(1− γ)
(1 + γ)(1− λ)(1 + λ)2
.
(b) When λ ∈ [γ/(1 + γ),min{1/(1 + γ), γ}], both IC* constraints bind,
b > pθ, pM = 1, pH = 1−
γ
(1 + γ)λ
, and V = 1−
γλ
(1 + γ)(1 + λ)2
.
(c) When λ ∈ [1/(1 + γ), γ), only the IC∗L constraint binds,
b = pθ, pM = 1, pH =
2λ− γ
λ(2 + γ)
, and V =
2(1 + λ) + γ
2 + γ + λ(2 + γ)
.
2. Suppose that γ > 1.
(a) When λ < γ/2, only the IC∗L constraint binds,
b = pθ, pH = 0, pM =
1
1 + γ − 2λ
, and V =
1 + γ
(1 + γ − 2λ)(1 + λ)2
.
(b) When λ ∈ [γ/2, γ), only the IC∗L constraint binds,
b = pθ, pM = 1, pH =
2λ− γ
λ(γ + 2)
, and V = 1−
γλ
(2 + γ)(1 + λ)
.
The proof of lemma 3 proceeds in two parts.
Part 1 (γ ≥ 1).
We set up the following relaxed problem:
min
b,pL,pM ,pH
(1− q)2(1− pL) + 2q(1− q)(1− pM) + q
2(1− pH)
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subject to the high-type ex post IR constraints:
b ≥ pθ
to the probability constraints:
pL ≤ 1, pM ≤ 1, 0 ≤ pH
























Step 1. We want to show that pL = 1. We first note that setting pL = 1 maximizes the
LHS of the relaxed low-type IC* constraint and does not affect the RHS. It is immediate to
see that the high-type ex post constraint is not affected either.
Step 2. We want to show that the relaxed low-type IC* constraint binds. Suppose it does
not. It is possible to increase pH thus decreasing the objective function without violating the
constraint (note that there is no constraint that pH < 1 in the relaxed problem).
Step 3. We want to show that the high-type ex post constraint binds. Suppose it does not.
Then b > pθ, and it is possible to reduce b without violating the ex post constraint. But this
makes the low-type relaxed IC* constraint slack, because −b appears in the LHS and b in the
RHS. Because step 2 concluded that the low-type relaxed IC* constraint cannot be slack in
the solution, we have proved that the ex post constraint cannot be slack.
Step 4. We want to show that for λ ≤ γ/2: pH = 0, pM =
1
1+γ−2λ
in the relaxed program.
The low-type relaxed IC* constraint and ex post constraint define the function
pM =
(1− λpH(γ + 2))
(γ − 2λ+ 1)
, (5)
substituting this function into the objective function
W = 2(1− q)(1− pM) + q(1− pH)
duly simplified in light of step 1, we obtain the following expression:
W = pH
(2λ+ γ + 3)λ
(γ − 2λ+ 1) (λ+ 1)
+
2γ − 3λ+ λγ − 2λ2
(γ − 2λ+ 1) (λ+ 1)
,
where we note that, because γ ≥ 2λ, the coefficient of pH is positive and the whole expression
is positive. Hence, minimization of W requires minimization pH . Setting pH = 0 and solving
for pM in (5) yields
pM =
1
1 + γ − 2λ
.
44




2γ − 3λ+ λγ − 2λ2
)
λ
(γ − 2λ+ 1) (λ+ 1)2
.
Step 5. We want to show that for λ ≥ γ/2, pM = 1, pH =
2λ−γ
λ(γ+2)
in the relaxed problem.
In light of the previous step, the solution pH = 0 yields pM > 1 and is not admissible when




. When λ ≥ γ/2, pH ≥ 0 and hence the solution is admissible. We note that
the probability of war equals:
C =
γλ
(γ + 2) (λ+ 1)
.
Step 6. We want to show that the solution constructed satisfies all the program constraints.
The low-type ex post constraint 1 − b ≥ (1 − p)θ is trivially satisfied, when b = pθ. Because
b > θ/2 and 1/2 > (1− p)θ, the low-type ex ante IC* constraint coincides with the low-type
ex ante relaxed IC* constraint. The condition 1 − b = 1 − pθ ≤ θ/2 yields 2 − 2pθ ≤ θ, i.e.,
1− θ ≤ 2pθ− 1, i.e., γ = 2pθ−1
1−θ
≥ 1. Hence, for γ ≥ 1, we conclude that 1− b ≤ θ/2. So, after
simplification, the ex ante high-type IC* constraint becomes:




























= (1− q) pθ + qθ/2,
which is satisfied (with slack when λ ≥ γ/2). The probability constraints are obviously
satisfied.
Part 2 (γ < 1). We allow for two cases:
Case 1. I will temporarily consider the following relaxed problem:
min
b,pL,pM ,pH
(1− q)2(1− pL) + 2q(1− q)(1− pM) + q
2(1− pH)











































which embed the assumption (to be verified ex post) that 1− b ≥ θ/2, and to the probability
constraints:
pL ≤ 1, pM ≤ 1, 0 ≤ pH
Step 1. As in the previous case, we conclude that pL = 1.
Step 2. We want to show that the low-type relaxed IC* constraint binds. Indeed, if it does
not, we can increase pH without violating either relaxed IC* constraint (note that the LHS of
the high-type relaxed IC* constraint increases in pH).
Step 3. We want to show that the high-type relaxed IC* constraint binds. Suppose not.
We can then reduce b because the LHS of the high-type relaxed IC* constraint increases in b
and the RHS decreases in b. This makes the low-type relaxed IC* constraint slack, without
changing pM and pH . But in light of step 2, this cannot minimize the objective function.
Hence, the high-type relaxed IC* constraint must bind.




relaxed problem. The binding relaxed ex ante IC* constraints define the function: [pM , b] (pH),
after substituting λ for q and γ for p, we obtain:
b =





2 (1− λpH − λγpH) (λ+ 1)
pM =
(1− λpH(1 + γ))
(γ + 1) (1− λ)
. (6)
Substituting pM into the objective function
W = 2(1− q)(1− pM) + q(1− pH)





2γ − λ− λγ − λ2 − λ2γ
(γ + 1) (λ+ 1) (1− λ)
,
because the coefficient of pH is positive, this quantity is minimized by setting pH = 0. Then,




(−2λ− γ + θλ+ θγ − 1)
pM =
1
(γ + 1) (1− λ)
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we know that 1 ≥ γ ≥ λ, so pM ≥ 0, but the condition pM ≤ 1 yields
1
(γ+1)(1−λ)
− 1 ≤ 0, i.e.,
λ ≤ γ
γ+1
, as stated. We note that the probability of war equals:
C =
(
λ− 2γ + λγ + λ2 + λ2γ
)
λ
(γ + 1) (λ+ 1) (λ− 1)
.




original problem. Again, the low-type ex ante IC* constraint coincides with the relaxed low-
type ex ante IC* constraint. We need to show that the ex post constraint b ≥ pθ is satisfied.




(λ+ 1)−1 (1− γ) (1− θ) λ > 0.
Finally we show that the high-type IC* constraint coincides with the (binding) relaxed high-
type IC* constraint, i.e., that 1 − b ≥ θ/2. Note in fact, that this implies that the ex post
constraint 1 − b ≥ (1− p) θ is satisfied, because θ/2 > (1− p) θ. Indeed, after simplification,
we obtain:
1− b− θ/2 =
1
2
(λ+ 1)−1 (1− γ) (1− θ) λ ≥ 0.
Step 6. We want to show that for λ ∈ [γ/(1+γ),min{1/(1+γ), γ}], pM = 1, pH = 1−
γ
(1+γ)λ
solves the relaxed problem. When λ > γ/(1+γ), setting pH = 0 violates the constraint pM = 1.
Further, the expression (6) reveals that pM decreases in pH . Hence minimization of pH , which
induces minimization of W , requires setting pM = 1. Solving for b and pH , we obtain:
b = −
(−λ− 3γ + 2θγ − λγ − γ2 + θγ2 − 1)
2λ+ 2γ + 2λγ + 2
pH =
λ− γ + λγ









Step 7. We want to show that for λ ∈ [γ/(1+γ),min{1/(1+γ), γ}], pM = 1, pH = 1−
γ
(1+γ)λ
solves the original problem. Again, the low-type ex ante IC* constraint coincides with the
relaxed low-type ex ante IC* constraint. We need to show that the ex post constraint b ≥ pθ




(γ + 1)−1 (λ+ 1)−1 (λ + λγ − 1) (θ − 1) γ
and this quantity is positive if and only if λ ≤ 1
γ+1
. Finally we show that the high-type ex ante
IC* constraint coincides with the (binding) relaxed high-type ex ante IC* constraint, i.e., that
1 − b ≥ θ/2. Note in fact, that this implies that the ex post constraint 1 − b ≥ (1− p) θ is
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satisfied, because θ/2 > (1− p) θ. Indeed, after simplification, we obtain:
1− b− θ/2 =
1
2
(γ + 1)−1 (λ+ 1)−1 (1− θ)
(
λ− γ + λγ − γ2 + 1
)
and λ−γ+λγ−γ2+1 ≥ 0 if and only if λ ≥ 1
γ+1
(γ + γ2 − 1) but because 1
γ+1
(γ + γ2 − 1) <
γ
γ+1
, this condition is less stringent than λ ≥ γ
γ+1
.




problem. Consider now the same relaxed problem that we considered in the proof for the case
of γ ≥ 1. We know from the analysis for the case γ ≥ 1, that this relaxed problem is solved by
pH = 0, pM =
1
1+γ−2λ
, b = pθ for λ < γ/2 and by pM = 1, pH =
2λ−γ
λ(γ+2)
, b = pθ for λ ∈ [γ/2, γ).






(γ + 1)−1 (1− γ) (γ + 2)
and this quantity is positive when γ ≤ 1. Hence the possibility that λ < γ/2 is ruled out: On




with b = pθ. We now need to show that this is also the solution of the original problem. Again,
the low-type ex ante IC* constraint coincides with the relaxed low-type ex ante IC* constraint.
Consider the ex ante high-type IC* constraint. The condition 1 − b = 1 − pθ ≥ θ/2 yields
γ = 2pθ−1
1−θ
≤ 1. Hence, for γ ≤ 1, we conclude that 1−b ≥ θ/2, and hence that 1−b ≥ (1− p) θ.
So the ex ante high-type IC* constraint becomes:

















and indeed, after simplification, the LHS equals:
1
2
(γ + 2)−1 (λ + 1)−1 (λ+ λγ − 1) (1− θ) γ,
a positive quantity as long as λ + λγ − 1, i.e., λ > 1
γ+1
, which is exactly the condition under
which we operate.
This concludes the proof of the Lemma 3, and hence of Proposition 4.
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